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I. INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, psychiatrist Steve Bauer spent four hours every two
weeks driving round trip to see his patients. 1 His main office was at the
*J.D. May 2017, The University of Akron School of Law. The author wishes to thank the staff of
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Duluth-based Human Development Center. 2 Due to the rural nature of
Minnesota, the Human Development Center developed an out-post clinic
in Grand Marais. 3 To effectively treat his patients, Dr. Bauer made this
drive to treat only a few individuals. 4
In 2004, Dr. Steve Bauer received a grant to purchase equipment
for telemental health visits. 5 Because of this grant, Bauer has been able
to assess his patients and provide necessary consultations without
leaving his office. 6 The four hours that he does not spend driving has
allowed him to increase the number of patients he is able to see and
help. 7 Dr. Bauer’s situation is but one of many examples of a nationwide
problem facing mental health practitioners trying to provide accessible,
readily-available mental health care to underserved populations of rural
patients.
Telepsychiatry, one of the most effective means of overcoming the
obstacles which frustrate full mental healthcare justice for rural
populations, has been defined as “the delivery of health care and the
exchange of health information for purposes of providing psychiatric
services across distances.” 8 Modern technological advancements (which
have rendered the equipment essential to the provision of telepsychiatry
less costly) could provide a solution to the issue that Dr. Bauer and many
others health professionals are encountering. 9 However, even with
suitable solutions, there are still many legal roadblocks preventing the
widespread implementation of telepsychiatry.
In the United States, there are an estimated fifteen million rural
residents who suffer from some type of mental health illness. 10 These
individuals have significant healthcare demands but obstacles prevent

the Akron Law Review for its editorial assistance, William Rininger, J.D., and Professor Julie
Aultman, Ph.D., for her invaluable assistance.
1. Jeanne Mettner, The Doctor is In. . . Another Town: Telepsychiatry Brings Care to
People in Rural Minnesota, 96 MINN. MED. 22, 23 (2013).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The lack of patients is not due to a deficit of individuals with mental illness, but is
instead attributable to a dearth of knowledge and the negative stigma in rural areas concerning
mental illness.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Marta Valdagno et al., Telepsychiatry: New Perspectives and Open Issues, 19 CNS
SPECTRUMS 479, 479 (2014).
9. Id.
10. Laura Weiss Roberts et al., Frontier Ethics: Mental Health Care Needs and Ethical
Dilemmas in Rural Communities, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 497, 497 (1999).
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them from receiving needed care. 11 These obstacles include, but are not
limited to, insufficient access to multidisciplinary clinicians, crisis
services, mental health and general medical clinics, in-patient and outpatient hospitals, and innovative medicines and other therapies. 12 These
obstacles are amplified in rural areas by deficiencies in basic services
like transportation, communication systems, and education. 13
The mental health needs in rural areas are immense. 14 Currently,
suicide rates in rural communities far surpass urban communities. 15 One
of the leading causes of suicide is an untreated or mismanaged mental
health disorder. 16 To combat suicide, psychiatrists use various
techniques. One of the most prevalent treatments for suicidal ideations is
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT). 17
One recurring issue in this field is the uncertainty of malpractice
liability. This comment presents a potential solution that serves to bring
clarity to one aspect of this conundrum. This comment addresses
liability for psychiatric medical malpractice with a focus on the
application of CBT through telepsychiatry in the context of patients with
suicidal ideations. Due to the nature of psychiatry and the difficulties
inherent in the field, psychiatric medical malpractice law suits are still a
prominent concern, 18 especially in actions against mental health
professionals which frequently arise out of patient suicides. 19
Under current law, the standard of care is the same for all
psychiatrists regardless of if one practices traditional psychiatry or

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 502.
15. Id. at 498; see also Jay H. Shore et al., Emergency Management Guidelines for
Telepsychiatry, 29 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 199, 199 (2007).
16. See Joel L. Young, Untreated Mental Illness: Understanding the Effects, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/when-your-adult-child-breaksyour-heart/201512/untreated-mental-illness; Not Another Life to Lose: Suicide in America, OKLA.
DEP’T MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS., https://www.ok.gov/odmhsas/
documents/suicide%20infographic.pdf (last visited July 3, 2017).
17. See generally Barbara Stanley et al., Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Suicide
Prevention (CBT-SP): Treatment Model, Feasibility, and Acceptability, 48 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1005 (2009).
18. Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care Reform and Medical Malpractice Claims, 38 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 871, 873 (2010) (“There are no readily accessible national statistics on medical
malpractice case filings, but there are several types of data from which national trends may be
derived. All of the available data clearly suggest the number of cases filed has dropped significantly
in the last decade.”).
19. Carol I. Tsao & Joseph B. Layde, A Basic Review of Psychiatric Medical Malpractice
Law in the United States, 48 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 309, 309 (2007).
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practices through telepsychiatry. 20 This should not be the case. Due to
the lack of personal contact with the patient and other contributing
factors, mental health providers should be held to a heightened standard
of care when performing their duties using telepsychiatry.
Part II of this comment provides a brief history of the evolution of
telehealth. It also furnishes a background on the medical principles
pertinent to this comment, especially serious mental trauma with an
emphasis on suicidal ideations. An understanding of the process of CBT
for suicide prevention (CBT-SP) and internet based CBT (I-CBT) is
necessary in demonstrating that the traditional standard of care is
preferable over a less rigorous standard.
Part III consists of an extensive outlook on psychiatric medical
malpractice law. This Part is structured around the three elements of a
psychiatric medical malpractice claim: (1) duty, (2) breach of that duty,
and (3) causation. Notably, this part examines psychiatric medical
malpractice claims in light of the growing field of telepsychiatry.
Part IV discusses a new approach for handling psychiatric medical
malpractice claims when the practitioner is implementing telepsychiatry.
This Part provides a recommendation on a new standard of care that
should be implemented for all practicing telepsychiatrists. This Part also
provides additional recommendations on how to prevent psychiatric
medical malpractice with more robust medical protocols, policies, and
standards for telepsychiatry.
II. HISTORY AND MEDICAL BACKGROUND
This Part begins with a general overview of the history of telehealth
and telepsychiatry. Additionally, this Part provides background
information on the medical aspects of psychiatry in general—
information which is essential to a full understanding of the issues and
themes addressed in this comment.
A.

The History of Telehealth

Telehealth is defined as the use of electronic information and
telecommunications technologies to support long-distance clinical
healthcare, patient and professional health-related education and
training, public health, and health administration. 21 Recently, there has
20. See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252, 255
(Iowa 2015); see also Charles D. Cash, Telepsychiatry and Risk Management, 8 INNOVATIONS
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 26, 28 (2011).
21. LuAnn E. White et al., Technology Meets Healthcare: Distance Learning and Telehealth,
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been increased acceptance of and interest in all forms of telehealth.22
Due to the increasing costs of healthcare, many medical professionals
are searching for new ways of providing affordable, yet high-quality,
healthcare.
The concept of telehealth has been around for centuries. Even
though there is not a definitive date for the creation of telehealth, its
origins can arguably be traced back to the Dark Ages. 23 During this time,
medical professionals would transport information about the bubonic
plague across Europe. 24 By the twentieth century, the telephone became
a mainstay of telehealth, providing physicians and other health
professionals with a tool to accurately communicate and transfer medical
information. 25 One of the earliest purposes of telehealth—the delivery of
healthcare to individuals in remote areas—is still one of its premier
objectives. 26
With respect to telepsychiatry, the invention of the television
contributed more to the development of telepsychiatry than any other
factor. 27 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, mental health professions
conducted consultations over two-way, closed-circuit televisions which
allowed mental health professionals to help and educate patients and
other physicians. 28 Televisions also allowed mental health care
professionals to treat individuals who were in remote and less populated
regions; this aspect of telehealth is implemented today through the use of
internet-based communication devices. 29 These aspects are crucial to
provide basic mental health treatment for individuals in rural areas,
especially concerning individuals with suicidal ideations.
B.

Medical Background

This subpart provides a brief synopsis of the underlying medical
background, first discussing mental health trauma and the concept of
suicidal ideations. These mental health issues are then examined through
the lens of CBT and I-CBT. The use of telepsychiatry in implementing
these therapies can help combat many issues within the rural mental
3 OCHSNER J. 22, 23 (2001).
22. See Valdagno et al., supra note 8, at 479.
23. See Karen M. Zundel, Telemedicine: History, Applications, and Impact on Librarianship,
84 BULL. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 71, 72 (1996).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 73.
27. Id. at 75.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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health community.
1. Mental Health Trauma and Suicidal Ideations
In 2013, suicide was the tenth leading cause of death in America—
over 40,000 deaths were attributable to suicide. 30 While there are many
triggering factors that mental health practitioners look to in assessing
suicide risk, one of the most salient factors is previous mental health
issues. Patients with previous mental health issues have been shown to
be at greater risk for suicide. 31 Other risk factors include: (i) depression
and other mental disorders, or a substance-abuse disorder (often in
combination with other mental disorders); (ii) prior suicide attempts; (iii)
a family history of mental disorder or substance abuse; (iv) family
history of suicide; (v) family violence, including physical or sexual
abuse; (vi) firearms in the home; 32 (vii) incarceration; and (viii)
exposure to the suicidal behavior of others, such as family members,
peers, or celebrities. 33
One of the most prevalent methods used to combat suicide and
suicidal ideations is CBT. CBT aims to use therapeutic relationships to
identify and facilitate a change in an individual’s cognitions, 34 through
the use of cognitive and behavioral interventions. 35 Cognitive theory
shows an individual that emotions, psychological responses, and
behaviors are a product of an individual’s present thoughts. 36 Another
30. Suicide: Facts at a Glance 2015, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf (last visited May 28, 2017). 2013 is the most recent year for which all
data is available.
31. Jay H. Shore et al., supra note 15, at 199-200.
32. This risk factor is more prevalent in the United States. See Erin Grinshteyn & David
Hemenway, Violent Death Rates: The U.S. Compared with Other High-Income OECD Countries,
2010, 129 AM. J. MED. 266 (2016).
33. See Stephen J. Tripodi & Kimberly Bender, Inmate Suicide: Prevalence, Assessment, and
Protocols, 7 BRIEF TREATMENT & CRISIS INTERVENTION 40 (2007), available at
http://btci.edina.clockss.org/cgi/content/full/7/1/40/; Risk Factors and Warning Signs, AM. FOUND.
FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION, https://afsp.org/about-suicide/risk-factors-and-warning-signs/ (last
visited May 28, 2017).
34. Cognitions consist of, but are not limited to, negative automatic thoughts, dysfunctional
assumptions, and core beliefs. See FRANK WILLS & DIANA SANDERS, COGNITIVE BEHAVIOUR
THERAPY 229 (3rd ed. 2013).
35. Georgia Konstantinou, The Relationship of Counselling Psychology Training with CBT:
Implications for Research and Practices, 29 COUNSELLING PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 43 (2014).
36. John D. Matthews, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Approach for Suicidal Thinking and
Behaviors in Depression, in MENTAL DISORDERS: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 24
(Robert
Woolfolk
&
Lesley
Allen
eds.,
2013),
available
at
http://www.intechopen.com/books/mental-disorders-theoretical-and-empiricalperspectives/cognitive-behavioral-therapy-approach-for-suicidal-thinking-and-behaviors-indepression.
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function of CBT is to reduce the subject’s negative emotional reactions,
distressing physiological responses, and self-defeating behaviors. 37
The “father” of CBT, A. T. Beck, found that depressed patients
with suicidal ideations view themselves as defective, inadequate,
diseased, or deprived and thus worthless or undesirable. 38 Additionally,
the focus of CBT for a suicidal patient is to “identify the perceived
unsolvable problem; reduce cognitive distortions and errors in logic with
regards to his or her views of self, others, and future; improve problem
solving skills; increase motivation to problem solve; reduce perceived
emotional pain; and encourage acceptance of emotional pain as part of
everyday life.” 39
The aims of treatment for CBT should be directed toward
addressing specific cognitive biases and distortions, developing problem
solving techniques, accepting and tolerating emotional pain, improving
communications, reducing stress, and developing a support system. 40
Studies and examinations of the use of CBT with suicidal patients point
to the effectiveness of CBT in suicide prevention. 41
2. Internet-Based Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
Internet-based cognitive behavioral therapy (I-CBT) is the delivery
of treatment components and ongoing support systems using electronic
mail, webpages, and video conferencing. 42 Use of I-CBT as a therapeutic
device is relatively new and research on I-CBT is still somewhat
undeveloped (although rapidly growing), 43 but from the existing
scholarship, it is clear that human interaction between the patient and the
health care provider cannot be completely absent. 44
Patients who may benefit most from receiving this type of treatment
are those located in rural areas without access to traditional face-to-face
psychiatry. 45 However, many of the obstacles which prevent individuals
from accessing traditional psychiatric care also hinder implementation of
this type of therapy. Internet-based CBT requires individuals to use self37. Id. at 25.
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id. at 29.
40. Id. at 33.
41. Id. at 38-40.
42. Gerhard Andersson, Using the Internet to Provide Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, 47
BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 175, 175 (2009).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 177.
45. See Brian Grady, Promises and Limitations of Telepsychiatry in Rural Adult Mental
Health Care, 11 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 199, 199 (2012).
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guided self-help materials presented via the internet; the psychiatrist
provides the patients with encouragement and occasionally directs
therapeutic activities, such as face-to-face consultations and medication
therapy. 46 However, geographical barriers, along with a lack of
education and communication systems, can still be troublesome. 47
Statistically, persons living in rural areas are under-educated, with many
discontinuing their education following high school graduation. 48 This
limitation must be taken into account when developing the self-help
materials, maneuvering the Internet and internet-based services, and
providing health care education regarding diagnosis and treatment
options.
As discussed above, the field of psychiatry has undergone
tremendous growth in recent years, perhaps most in regards to the new
and varied means of providing treatment. However, this growth has not
been matched by a commensurate change in the law. As such, medical
malpractice laws, insofar as they apply to the implementation of
telemedicine, have become somewhat outdated.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A medical malpractice action is a particular type of negligence
action. 49 As a particular type of negligence action, medical malpractice,
in its simplest form, consists of a medical diagnosis or treatment which
falls below the standard of care established by law for the protection of
another against unreasonable risk of harm. 50 The elements that are
needed for a successful claim of medical malpractice are: (i) duty, (ii)
breach of duty, (iii) causation, and (iv) injury. 51
A.

Duty/Duty to Treat
Absent a doctor-patient relationship, physicians have no general

46. See Andersson, supra note 42, at 175.
47. See Roberts et al., supra note 10.
48. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, THE STATUS OF RURAL EDUCATION 64,
88 (2007), available at https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007040.pdf.
49. See Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1068 (Colo. 2011).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
51. See, e.g., Winn v. Posades, 913 A.2d 407, 411 (Conn. 2007); Durham v. HTH Corp., 870
A.2d 577, 579 (Me. 2005); Brown v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 313, 316-17 (Mich. 2007); Paz v. Brush
Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 4 (Miss. 2007); Barr v. Great Falls Int’l Airport Auth., 107
P.3d 471, 477 (Mont. 2005); Avery v. Diedrich, 734 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Wis. 2007). For purposes of
this article, injury is defined as a personal or bodily injury, including death, affecting an individual’s
health. See Personal Injury, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1969).
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obligation to undertake the treatment of a patient. 52 This issue was first
addressed in Hurley v. Eddingfield, wherein the only available physician
refused to see an ill patient who subsequently died. 53 The Hurley court
rejected an argument that the doctor had a duty similar to innkeepers and
common carriers and found that a doctor has no affirmative duty to treat
someone who he has not taken on as a patient. 54 The duty to treat has
been viewed as the threshold element when examining a medical
malpractice claim. 55 This duty will only arise from either an express or
implied physician-patient relationship. 56 An express physician-patient
relationship is established when the patient has sought out the
physician’s services and the doctor provides them to the individual
directly. 57 An implied physician-patient relationship will be found by the
courts where there is an affirmative action to treat the patient or
prescribe a course of treatment. 58
Due to the hybrid nature of medical malpractice lawsuits (i.e., a
fusion of contract and tort law), the need for a physician-patient
relationship at the time of the injury is a must and if there is not a
contractual relationship, there cannot be liability on the physician. 59 This
assertion is derived from principles of contract law, where the physician
has a fiduciary responsibility to the patient but retains the right to enter
into a contract with the patient that will be mutually beneficial.60
Without this relationship, there is an absence of duty on the part of the
physician to provide any medical services, and therefore, the physician
would not be capable of breaching a duty to the patient.
Another element of duty is the informed consent process, and the
52. See Harper v. Hippensteel, 994 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
53. 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901).
54. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (stating that an
innkeeper has a duty to his guests to protect them from unreasonable risk of harm).
55. Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 802 A.2d 440, 444 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
56. See id. at 445-46; J. Gregory Lennon, Easing the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Restricting
the Creation of Duty Through an Implied Doctor-Patient Relationship, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 363, 367 (2004).
57. See Lennon, supra note 56, at 367.
58. Id.; Sterling, 802 A.2d at 455 (noting that a physician-patient relationship may be implied
“where the doctor takes affirmative action to participate in the care and treatment of a patient”); see
also Mozingo v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 415 S.E.2d 341, 345-46 (N.C. 1992) (holding that
because the defendant knew the residents at the hospital were actually treating patients when he
undertook the duty to supervise the residents as an on-call supervising physician the defendant owed
a duty to the patients under his residents’ care); but see Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 943 (Kan. 2001)
(holding that an agreement to give a consultation the next day did not create a physician-patient
relationship because of a lack of meaningful contact with the patient).
59. Id. at 364.
60. Id. at 364-65; see Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
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duty of disclosure in providing patients with comprehensive medical
information that is understandable to the patient. In recognizing the
dignity of persons and basic human freedoms, patients have the right to
be fully informed and to make informed decisions on matters concerning
their health and treatment. 61 Most often, questions about whether a
patient gave informed consent revolve around the amount and type of
information that the healthcare professional was required to give to the
patient and what information was actually communicated. Courts have
found that, for informed consent to be valid, the physician must provide
all material facts.62 The definition of “material fact” is the subject of
great debate.
There are two competing legal theories concerning what type of
information must be disclosed to satisfy the informed consent
requirement. The first is what a reasonable medical practitioner would
disclose. This legal standard if often locality-based, in that the standard
is what a reasonably prudent medical practitioner, in good standing in
the jurisdiction of the evaluating court, would do in the same situation. 63
A slight majority of states have adopted this standard. 64 The second legal
standard is that of the reasonable prudent patient standard, or what a
reasonable prudent patient would want to know under the same
situation. 65 This theory focuses on patient autonomy over medical
paternalism. 66 Without informed consent, healthcare providers can be
held liable for medical malpractice unless they can prove that they were
acting within the bounds of an exception.
In most jurisdictions, the duty of informed consent is subject to
certain exceptions. 67 The first exception, known as therapeutic privilege,
applies when a health care provider makes a clinical decision to
withhold information from the patient believing that providing such
information would be harmful, especially if it is likely to cause a great
deal of mental stress and impair the patient’s decisional capacity. 68 The
61. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body.”).
62. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
63. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916 (1994); see also
Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan. 1960).
64. Schuck, supra note 63, at 916.
65. See generally Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
66. Schuck, supra note 63, at 916.
67. Id. at 919.
68. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789; Schuck, supra note 63, at 919.
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second exception applies when the patient lacks clinical competency
(i.e., mental disability or infancy). 69 There is also an exception for
emergency situations. 70 Another exception is in situations where the risk
is either known to the patient or is so obvious as to justify a presumption
on the part of the physician that the patient has knowledge of the risk. 71
The final exception is in situations where the physician does not know of
an otherwise material risk, does not have reason to know of the
otherwise material risk, and could not have been aware of it in the
exercise of ordinary care. 72 When these exceptions are applicable, the
doctor will not be held liable for the nondisclosure.
B.

Breach of Duty

The standard for breach of duty has been succinctly phrased as
follows: “[i]n the law of negligence, the standard of care is the degree of
care that a reasonable person should exercise.” 73 In an action for medical
malpractice, the medical professional will be held to a specialized
standard of care, that of a reasonable, competent medical professional. In
these actions, the trier of fact must determine if the defendant’s conduct
(i.e., the medical professional’s diagnosis or treatment) conformed to the
medical standard or customs. 74 Unlike other negligence cases, in medical
malpractice, the standard of care must be established by expert
testimony. 75 The use of expert testimony is needed because the proper
exercise of professional medical judgment, or the lack thereof, is not
usually apparent to the average lay juror.76
After the plaintiff has established the standard of care, the plaintiff
will have to show that the medical practitioner has breached the standard
of care. 77 To breach a standard of care, the plaintiff must show that the
healthcare provider’s care fell beneath the level of care that a reasonably
prudent healthcare provider would have given in a similar situation. 78 To

69. Schuck, supra note 63, at 919.
70. Id.; Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89.
71. Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Iowa 1987).
72. Id.
73. John C. Drapp III, The National Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Actions: Does
Small Area Analysis Make it Another Legal Fiction?, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 95, 97 (2003)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 97-98.
77. Id. at 98.
78. Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185, 186 (Ind. 1992); see also BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 309 (7th ed. 2013) (“[I]n a professional
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do so, the plaintiff must use expert testimony to show that the defendant
deviated from the acceptable norm. 79
To establish the accepted norm, the plaintiff’s expert will rely on
one of two legal standards. The first is commonly called the “locality
rule”; the second is termed the “national standard of care.” The locality
rule defines the standard of care as the degree of care, skill, and
proficiency which is commonly expected by a prudent physician, at the
time care was given and in similar localities.80 In contrast, the national
standard of care requires that a medical professional provide her patients
with care comparable to the care provided to patients anywhere in the
United States, regardless of the skill and knowledge of the particular
professional and the area in which the care is provided. 81 The national
standard of care has garnered wide support and is now the majority
rule. 82 This movement is largely based on the nationalization of medical
education and the accessibility to professional and scientific journals by
electronic databases. 83
When examining the standard of care, there are a few limited
exceptions. The first exception is that of respectable minority. This
exception allows for variation in clinical judgment.84 The second
exception is the “two schools of thought” doctrine. The “two schools of
thought” doctrine poses that a health care professional will not be held
liable to a plaintiff merely for exercising judgment in applying a
treatment that is supported by other medical professionals. 85 This
doctrine goes further in that the health care provider will not be liable in

negligence cause of action, the standard of care that the plaintiff must prove is that the professional
failed to conform to the generally recognized and accepted practices in his profession. If the
plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that the professional failed to conform to the generally recognized
and accepted practices in his profession, then the professional cannot be found liable as a matter of
law.”).
79. FURROW ET AL., supra note 78, at 309.
80. Vergara, 593 N.E.2d at 186 (quoting Burke v. Capello, 520 N.E. 2d 439, 441 (Ind.
1988)).
81. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 867 (Miss. 1985).
82. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 78, at 360; Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of
Deference to Custom: Malpractice at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 166, n. 15
(2000).
83. Id. at 870-71; see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 78, at 310 (stating that most states
have moved away from the locality rule due to worries about a “conspiracy of silence” (i.e., local
physicians are likely unwilling to testify against one another) which would limit the availability of
experts).
84. See Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87 (Me. 1974) (“Even if the evidence could be
construed to suggest that an alternative treatment would have been feasible, a physician does not
incur liability merely by electing to pursue one of several recognized courses of treatment.”).
85. Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 966 (Pa. 1992).
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applying such a treatment even if the other experts would have favored a
different course of treatment. 86 The final exception is clinical innovation.
Clinical innovation involves the health care provider modifying ordinary
procedures in hopes of serving his individual patient better.87
C.

Causation

Causation refers to any act or omission inconsistent with an
existing standard of care that is a substantial factor in bringing about an
injury. 88 For the most part, the issue of causation arises in medical
malpractice suits when the plaintiff has a preexisting condition, and it is
questionable whether the negligent act of the health care provider was
the cause of the bad outcome or if the event would have happened
anyways. 89 Causation is satisfied by a showing that the injury was the
natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s actions.90
The element of causation can become increasing difficult to
establish as the number of individuals providing care to the patient
increases. 91 However, where there are multiple individuals who act in
concert to commit a wrong, the multiple parties will be considered joint
tortfeasors. 92 Due to the adoption of comparative fault in the majority of
jurisdictions, 93 the trier of fact may be required to apportion the damage

86. Id.
87. E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts
on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 14-15 (2003); see also Brook v. St. John’s
Hickey Mem’l Hosp., 380 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. 1978) (holding that a physician’s choice to use a
different injection site was not a breach of the standard of care due to the physician’s knowledge of
anatomy, and the extensive literature on the subject). This is a controversial issue in the realm of
psychiatry as there are significant inconsistencies in clinical practice. For example, not all
psychiatrists value psychotherapy and instead choose to treat only with pharmaceuticals and
management of medications.
88. Steven E. Pegalis, Proximate Cause, 1 AM. LAW MED. MALP. § 5:1 (2016);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). In the context of suicide and suicidal ideations,
an injury can be death, injury from an unsuccessful attempt, injury or death to another, and further
mental health injuries.
89. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 78, at 400.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 401.
92. Id.; see also Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Joint and Several Liability of Physicians
Whose Independent Negligence in Treatment of Patient Causes Indivisible Injury, 9 A.L.R.5th 746
(2011) (“Multiple physicians have been held jointly and severally liable with each other for injuries
negligently inflicted, in the absence of evidence delineating the aspects of the injury caused by the
respective negligence of the individual physicians, even though they did not act in concert or
concurrently.”).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979) (stating when two or more
individuals are liable in a tort action, there is a right of contribution among the tortfeasors).
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amount among the joint tortfeasors. 94
Additionally, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (“the thing speaks for
itself”) 95 has been implemented in situations where several defendants
could have caused injury to the plaintiff. 96 Finally, in the seminal case of
Ybarra v. Spangard, the court found that when there is uncertainty as to
which defendant caused the injury, the burden is shifted to the joint
tortfeasors to prove that they were not the cause of the injury. 97
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE WITHIN TELEPSYCHIATRY FOR CBT
TREATMENT FOR PATIENTS WITH SUICIDAL IDEATIONS
This section examines the general principles of medical malpractice
discussed above in connection with telepsychiatry. This section begins
by discussing where a medical malpractice action could be brought and
what law should govern. Secondly, this part discusses common bases for
medical malpractice suits. When an action for medical malpractice is
brought against a mental health professional, the plaintiff must prove all
the elements of the cause of action.98 As in any other type of medical
malpractice action, the standard of care must be distinguished from the
quality of the care that is provided. 99 Two of the most prevalent wrongs
that lead to a cause of action are a mental health professional’s failure to
consider a medical condition as the cause of the patient’s mental or
emotional pain and the failure to take action when a patient threatens
violence against him or herself or against others.100 The standard of care
must be established by expert testimony, practice guidelines, psychiatric
literature, hospital policies and procedures, or state and federal
guidelines. 101
94. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 78, at 401. Note, however, that if a physician fails to
diagnose a patient’s underlying medical condition, the physician might be liable to the injured
plaintiff for all foreseeable injuries resulting from the later negligent medical treatment. Id.
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965) (stating that the trier of fact may
draw inferences that the harm was caused by the defendant because the type of action normally does
not occur without a negligent action).
96. See Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F.2d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir. 1983).
97. Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944) (“[W]here a plaintiff receives unusual
injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defendants who had any
control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be
called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct.”).
98. To reiterate, these elements are: (i) duty; (ii) breach of that duty; (iii) causation; and (iv)
injury.
99. LEE S. GOLDSMITH, 5 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A GUIDE TO MEDICAL ISSUES § 79.01
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2017).
100. Id.; see generally Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
101. GOLDSMITH, supra note 99.
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Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

The first issue that must be addressed concerning telepsychiatry is
where an individual can bring suit (i.e., the state where the patient is
located or the state where the psychiatrist is located) and what law
should apply when adopting a standard of care (i.e., the law of the
patient’s state or the law of the practitioner’s state).102 The United States
Supreme Court has held that to be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
courts of a state, an individual must have minimum contacts with that
state. 103 Minimum contacts are established when an individual
“purposefully avails [herself] of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
law.” 104 While the issue of personal jurisdiction is easily resolved where
a potential defendant had or has a physical presence in a state, modern
technologies complicate the determination of minimum contacts.
Through use of the internet, it is possible to connect with
individuals around the world at the touch of a button. This being so,
some courts have implemented a sliding scale test to measure personal
contacts when a defendant’s only contacts with a state were through
cyberspace.105 At one end of the scale are cases where the defendant
clearly conducts business over the internet in an active manner; here, it
is clear that if the defendant enters into contracts over the internet, they
have availed themselves of the protection of the states, and therefore,
personal jurisdiction is proper. 106 At the other end of the scale, in cases
where a website does little more than make information available to the
public, personal jurisdiction does not lie. 107 Finally, in cases in the
middle ground (interactive), information can be exchanged with the host
computer; jurisdiction is determined by focusing on the level of
interactivity and the commercial nature of the exchanged information.108
In applying these tests to telepsychiatry, it is clear that in many
instances, there will be jurisdiction over the defendant. This is because a
medical professional who provides medical care to a person located
102. See LYNN D. FLEISHER & JAMES C. DECHENE, TELEMEDICINE AND E-HEALTH LAW §
1.04 (2017).
103. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
104. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Note that, even if a person has sufficient
minimum contacts with a state such that jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible, jurisdiction will
not lie unless the state’s long-arm statute applies to the person’s activities.
105. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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within the boundaries of a state will likely be held to have actively
availed himself of the laws and jurisdiction of that State. 109
When looking at choice of law, the subject of medical malpractice
is extremely important and complex. 110 The complexities arise from the
significant differences in state policies regarding medical malpractice. 111
The choice of law doctrine is normally governed by legal precedent in
the jurisdiction hearing the case. 112 The governing jurisdiction will also
determine the factors determining the choice of law. Some factors that
could be examined by the courts are: (i) the relevant policies of the
forum state; (ii) the relevant policies of other interested states in the
determination of the particular issue; (iii) the protection of justified
expectations; (iv) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law; (v) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and (vi) the
ease of determination and application of the law to be applied. 113 Other
general principles that apply when determining the law that is to govern
a tort action are: (i) the place where the injury occurred; (ii) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (iii) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties; and (iv) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered. 114
There are two notable suggestions for resolving the choice of law
issue concerning telepsychiatry. One suggestion involves the idea that
the patient is “electronically transported” to the jurisdiction where the
physician is located. 115 The other is that the physician might be deemed
to have personally availed himself of the patient’s jurisdiction. 116 This is
because the jurisdiction where the patient suffered the injury will have
such a strong interest in adjudicating the matter and protecting its

109. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/49.5(e) (LexisNexis 2016) (stating any physician
practicing telemedicine within the State subjects him or herself to the jurisdiction of Illinois); but
see generally Bradley v. Mayo Found., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17505 (E.D. Ky. 1999).
110. Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Choice of Law, Medical Malpractice, and Telemedicine: The
Present Diagnosis with a Prescription for the Future, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 31, 31 (2000).
111. Id.
112. See FLEISHER & DECHENE, supra note 102.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971); but see RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (stating courts should only look at where the harm
occurs).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971).
115. Shannon S. Venable, Comment, A Call to Action: Georgia Must Adopt New Standard of
Care, Licensure, Reimbursement, and Privacy Laws for Telemedicine, 54 EMORY L.J. 1183, 119293 (2005).
116. See id.
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citizens. 117
These jurisdictional issues are further complicated by the different
ethical and professional implications posed by telepsychiatry. These
patients are in a vulnerable state, and policy should dictate that these
patients are afforded several protections by virtue of their vulnerability
and their roles as patients in the fiduciary therapeutic relationship. With
these factors in mind, the most likely outcome of this issue is that the
law applied will be the law where the treatment was received.118 If we
apply the law of the jurisdiction where the treatment was received, this
will afford the patient more protections, which are needed. Furthermore,
jurisdictions will be able to better regulate the physicians who act
locally, which will allow for better patient autonomy and safeguards,
such as the informed consent process. 119
B.

Practitioner-Patient Relationship and Informed Consent

Like traditional medical malpractice law suits, a practitioner-patient
relationship must exist between the medical professional practicing
telepsychiatry and a patient in order for the patient to sustain a
malpractice suit. In traditional psychiatry, the practitioner-patient
relationship is temporal, as each session lasts for a specific period of
time, but in telepsychiatry, this relationship is more fluid, as
telepsychiatry requires the patient to engage in other activities assigned
by the therapist outside of each session. 120 This fluidity causes additional
stress on the courts because whether a practitioner-patient relationship
exists is a question of law. 121 In determining whether a physician-patient
relationship existed, the courts will consider the relationship between the
parties, the nature of risk (foreseeability), and public policy. 122 The main
inquiry concerns whether the doctor was in a unique position to prevent
harm, the burden of preventing harm, and the patient’s reliance on the
physician. 123
Before beginning any type of mental health relationship, the
physician must obtain the patient’s informed consent. As in any other
117. See Christopher J. Caryl, Note, Malpractice and Other Legal Issues Preventing the
Development of Telemedicine, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 203 (1997).
118. See generally Rensberger, supra note 110.
119. See id. at 78-79.
120. Patricia C. Kuszler, Telemedicine and Integrated Health Care Delivery: Compounding
Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 297, 308 (1999).
121. See Doe v. Bradley, 58 A.3d 429, 447 (Del. Super. Ct. 2012).
122. White v. Harris, 36 A.3d 203, 205 (Vt. 2011).
123. See id. at 205-07 (holding that a single ninety-minute consultation was enough to
establish a physician-patient relationship).
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physician-patient relationship, this disclosure needs to consist of all
material facts. 124 Additionally, the risks and benefits telepsychiatry can
provide will vary from patient to patient, and the mental health
professional must tailor the informed consent process to each patient. 125
In a normal therapeutic session, a mental health professional will be
face-to-face with the patient. Medical professionals are trained to use all
of their senses in the examination of a patient. Through the use of
telepsychiatry, the use of all the human senses is hindered. The first
hindrances concern the senses of hearing, touch (e.g., taking vitals), and
sight. Mental health professionals need to gauge many non-verbal cues,
such as facial expressions and micro expressions. 126 These senses are
paramount in a face-to-face situation as anywhere from seven to thirtyfive percent of communication is accomplished verbally, while the
remaining communication is conducted through non-verbal cues. 127 One
useful tool that could be implemented to limit these issues is emotioncapture technology. 128 This technology applies acute analysis to the data
by recording patients’ facial expressions, analyzing videos, and
developing a tracking algorithm which will help clinicians interpret the
different emotions during a therapeutic session. 129
The main sense that is restricted through the use of telepsychiatry is
smell. Many individuals who have mental health issues self-treat by
using narcotics and alcohol. 130 A lack of face-to-face interaction
prevents a treating mental health professional from gauging whether the
individual is under the use of narcotics and/or alcohol. These hindrances
could lead to misunderstandings and misdiagnoses that could create risks
of further exacerbating the underlying mental health issues.131
In addition to these issues, the practice of telepsychiatry is still
relatively new and uncertain. The uncertainty and lack of empirical

124. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914); White v. Leimbach,
959 N.E.2d 1033, 1038-39 (Ohio 2011).
125. Patricia R. Recupero & Samara E. Rainey, Informed Consent to E-Therapy, 59 AM. J.
PSYCHOTHERAPY 319, 322 (2005).
126. Id.
127. WALLACE V. SCHMIDT ET AL., COMMUNICATING GLOBALLY: INTERCULTURAL
COMMUNICATION AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 95 (2007).
128. Rebecca Calhoun, Emotion-Capture Video Takes Tele-Psych to Deeper Levels, 2
TELEMEDICINE 1, 8 (2015).
129. Id. As with any technology, there is always the chance of error (e.g., false positives and
negatives). Another possible issue is the financial burden this technology could impose on rural
communities.
130. Marie Bussing-Birks, Mental Illness and Substance Abuse, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES.,
http://www.nber.org/digest/apr02/w8699.html (last visited July 1, 2017).
131. Recupero & Rainey, supra note 126, at 322.
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research concerning telepsychiatry might cause courts to view this type
of practice as experimental. 132 Any medical procedure (e.g., testing or
treatment) that is being used to diagnosis or treat will be considered
experimental (i.e., not established medical practice) until there is
medical evidence regarding the risks, benefits, and safety and efficiency
of the procedures. 133 If this type of therapy is defined as experimental,
the health care provider must divulge the experimental nature of the
treatment and all foreseeable consequences of the treatment. 134
In the field of telepsychiatry, this duty will most likely be
established when the psychiatrist either agrees to treat the patient, 135 or if
there is not an expressed agreement, when the first therapeutic session
takes place. 136 Additionally, mental health professionals must divulge all
material risks and should provide the patient with the possible
experimental nature of this type of therapy.
C.

Establishing the Standard of Care in Telepsychiatry

When examining the breach of duty, the most important factor will
be the establishment of the standard and the deviation from that
standard. The science and art of psychiatry is ever-changing. Advances
in modern technology and research have resulted in a rapid growth in
psychiatry. In the new age of the internet, all medical professionals have
the power to inform themselves about the newest technologies and
studies. This accessibility needs to be reflected in the standard of care.
It has been said there are two types of psychiatrists, “those who
have had patients commit suicide and those who will.” 137 In the field of
psychiatry, suicide is the most common occurrence underlying a claim
132. Id. at 327.
133. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Definition of Experimental Procedures: A Committee
Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1197, 1197 (2013).
134. Ahern v. Veterans Admin., 537 F.2d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 1976). This type of
technology has not been subjected to extensive studies, which even furthers the likelihood of being
considered experimental.
135. See Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“The law defines a
physician-patient relationship as a consensual relationship where the patient or someone acting on
the patient’s behalf knowingly employs a physician who consents to treat the patient.”); St. John v.
Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. 1995) (noting that a formal written contract is not necessary to
create a physician-patient relationship).
136. Irvin v. Smith, 31 P.3d 934, 941 (Kan. 2001) (holding that, generally, a physician-patient
relationship is created only when the patient is examined); McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045,
1050 (Ohio 1997) (finding that a lack of contract between the patient and the physician does not
preclude the finding of a relationship).
137. Robert I. Simon, Suicide Risk Assessment: What is the Standard of Care?, 30 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 340, 340 (2002).
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for medical malpractice. 138 The rarity of suicide and the complexities of
its causes have not allowed for a professional standard of care. 139 Due to
the lack of a professional standard of care, this standard must be
assessed through expert testimony.
Some mental health care professionals find that the standard of care
lies with a systematic suicide risk assessment, where the mental health
care provider must consider the risk and protective factors. 140 The
American Psychiatric Association (APA) has developed extensive
guidelines concerning the standard of care for suicide assessment. 141
Under the APA’s guidelines, the most important aspect of suicide
prevention is the initial psychiatric evaluation and assessment.142 If the
initial assessment is conducted correctly, this will provide the mental
health care professional with specific factors and features that can be
targeted for specific intervention. 143 The APA also notes that, due to
differing beliefs about suicide and death, simply asking about suicidal
ideations might not give the mental health care professional an accurate
or complete description of the issues. 144
One of the more common practices is the use of “no-harm
contracts”—normally oral contracts between the patient and the mental
health care provider whereby the patient agrees not to harm themselves
or others for a certain period of time. 145 These contracts are established
when the mental health care provider feels that the patient is at a
heightened risk for self-destructive behavior. 146 The rationale for using
these types of contracts is to reduce the client’s self-destructive behavior
and minimize liability to the mental health care professionals. 147
However, there is little, if any, empirical evidence showing that these
contracts are effective. 148 Additionally, the idea that the patient might
not be of sound mind to enter into this type of contract, or cannot grasp

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT
OF PATIENTS WITH SUICIDAL BEHAVIORS (2003).
142. Id. at 10; see Perez v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
143. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 142, at 10.
144. Id.
145. See generally Rebecca S. Hyldahl & Brent Richardson, Key Considerations for Using
No-Harm Contracts with Clients Who Self-Injure, 89 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 121 (2011).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 122.
148. Id. (“Clients who self-injure may not be able or willing to stop what has been an
effective, albeit destructive, coping strategy until they have addressed some of their underlying
issues and acquired effective replacement skills.”).
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the consequences of their actions, makes these types of contracts all the
more insufficient.
Disagreement over the standard of care between mental health
professionals has made defining it almost impossible for the legal
system. In Perez v. United States, the standard of care was established
by expert testimony, and the court held that the standard was breached
due to the mental health professional’s failure to make a proper
diagnosis after ascertaining a medical history and regular assessment of
the patient over several sessions. 149 The court noted that even though
there was conflicting testimony on whether the standard of care was
breached, the court found the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert more
persuasive. 150 This decision shows that the question of standard of care
is unique and subjective and can only be established on a case-by-case
basis using expert testimony. 151
This issue is further complicated by the different ethical
considerations that are posed by telepsychiatry. The most important
issue is the appropriateness of telepsychiatry as concerning suicidal
ideations. 152 Due to the severity of this condition, safeguards must be
taken to ensure the safety of the patients and others. In traditional
psychiatry, the mental health provider conducts treatment with the
patient present. During these sessions, the patient may become agitated,
requiring the mental health professional to take steps to prevent any
injury. 153 The mental health professional must be able to take substantial
steps to protect the patient and third parties, even if this means
involuntary hospitalization. 154 In Bell v. New York City Health &
Hospitals Corporations, the court held that a treating psychiatrist could
be held liable for releasing a patient without a careful and competent
examination. 155
Even when a careful and competent examination is performed,
issues can arise. The field of psychiatry is not an exact science, and there
is much disagreement among mental health professionals regarding

149. 883 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1285-87 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
150. Id. at 1288.
151. Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 854 (Ariz. 2004) (“what is necessary to satisfy the
standard will depend upon the facts of each case.”).
152. See Monique Manhal-Baugus, E-Therapy: Practical, Ethical, and Legal Issues, 4
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 551, 558-60 (2001).
153. Such interventions range from speaking to the patient to having the patient hospitalized.
154. See Patricia C. Kussmann, Annotation, Liability of Doctor, Psychiatrist, or Psychologist
for Failure to Take Steps to Prevent Patient’s Suicide, 81 A.L.R.5th 167, *9 (2000).
155. See Bell v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 787, 794 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982).
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diagnostic categories, treatments, and prognoses. 156 This causes mental
health professionals to make predictions of what would constitute the
best form of treatment, which in some circumstances involves a
calculated risk. 157 Many courts have held that a medical professional will
not be held liable for a bad result if the physician acts with due care in
pursuit of a course of treatment that is within an acceptable norm. 158
This issue is further exacerbated when applied to telepsychiatry.
D.

Liability for Suicide

As with any type of negligence, for liability to exist in a medical
malpractice action, there must be a causal connection between the
breach of duty and the injury that resulted. 159 Causation is established
when the evidence proves that the negligence was the probable cause of
the injury. 160 This means that a verdict cannot be based on speculation or
conjecture as to the element of causation. 161 Under traditional tort law, a
person is not liable for actions committed by another person and is not
under any duty to protect a person from harm. 162 However, if there is a
“special relationship,” an affirmative duty may arise. 163
In the context of suicide, the element of causation has elicited
differing views in the judicial system. Until recently, the common law
held that an individual could not be held liable for another’s suicidal
actions. 164 Under the common law, suicide is often a superseding act 165
156. Wulbrecht v. Jehle, 902 N.Y.S.2d 910, 919 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
157. Id. at 917.
158. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective
Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 49, 57-58 (1999); Hirahara v. Tanaka,
959 P.2d 830, 835 (Haw. 1998); Morlino v. Med. Ctr., 706 A.2d 721, 732 (N.J. 1998) (“Doctors
may exercise reasonable care and still produce a bad result.”); Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants,
P.C., No. 1-A-01-9702-CV-00069, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29,
1997); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 274-75 (Wis. 1996); Ouellette v. Subak, 391
N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986).
159. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Proximate Cause in Malpractice Cases, 13 A.L.R.2d 11, *2
(1950); Granicz v. Chirillo, 147 So. 3d 544, 547-48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]he proximate
cause element of negligence [focuses] on ‘whether and to what extent the defendant’s conduct
foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually occurred.’”).
160. Pappa v. Bonner, 105 So. 2d 87, 90 (Ala. 1958).
161. See Shipley, supra note 160, at *3.
162. Kockelman v. Segal, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, 557 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
163. Id. (“Such a special relationship is typically where the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable
and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the plaintiff’s
welfare.”) (citing Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 56, p. 374); see generally Tarasoff v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (1976). The relationship between a mental health
professional and their patient satisfies this special relationship.
164. C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Civil Liability for Death by Suicide, 11 A.L.R.2d 751, **2-3
(1950).
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that absolves an individual from liability. 166 While most jurisdictions
have abolished this rule, some have made exceptions.167 Some
jurisdictions require a special relationship for liability to exist, while
other jurisdictions take it further and require that special relationship to
be custodial in nature. 168 Under this view, liability would not exist for a
telepsychiatrist. In the context of telepsychiatry, individual patients
would most likely be considered outpatients. 169 Liability is rarely
imposed in situations concerning outpatients. 170
The more modern view focuses mainly on the aspect of
foreseeability. 171 In Foster v. Charter Medical Corporation, the
Alabama Supreme Court held that the question of causation will most
always hinge on the foreseeability of the patient’s suicidal ideation. 172
The court held that “[f]oreseeability of a decedent’s suicide is legally
sufficient . . . if the deceased had a history of suicidal proclivities, or
manifested suicidal proclivities in the presence of the defendant, or was
admitted to the facility of the defendant because of a suicide attempt.” 173
165. See, e.g., 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 43 (1988); Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 383
(6th Cir.1990); Gilmore v. Shell Oil Co., 613 So. 2d 1272, 1276-78 (Ala. 1993); Pompeneo v.
Verde Valley Guidance Clinic, Inc., 249 P.3d 1112, 1114 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“Intervening
causes become superseding causes when the ‘intervening force was unforeseeable and may be
described, with the benefit of hindsight, as extraordinary.’”); Eidson v. Reprod. Health Servs., 863
S.W.2d 621, 626-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 279 (Mont. 1989); R.D.
v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 28 (Wyo. 1994).
166. See McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983) (“As a general rule,
negligence actions seeking damages for the suicide of another will not lie because the act of suicide
is considered a deliberate, intentional and intervening act which precludes a finding that a given
defendant, in fact, is responsible for the harm.”); see also Winger v. Franciscan Med. Ctr., 701
N.E.2d 813, 816 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); but see Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Conn. 1997)
(stating that if suicide is a foreseeable result of a defendant’s tortious act, the suicide will not break
the chain of causation).
167. See, e.g., Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 330-31 (Haw. 1996).
168. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965); Nally v. Grace Cmty.
Church, 763 P.2d 948, 956 (Cal. 1988) (holding that nontherapist counselors did not have a duty to
prevent the suicide of a person who was not in their custody); Krieg, 781 P.2d at 279 (holding a
landlord-tenant relationship is not custodial in nature).
169. See generally Mark Olfson & Harold Alan Pincus, Measuring Outpatient Mental Health
Care in the United States, 13 HEALTH AFFAIRS 172 (1994) (stating there is not a standard definition
of what constitutes an outpatient, but does give input).
170. See Eisel v. Bd. of Educ., 597 A.2d 447, 450 (Md. 1991) (“Liability against therapists for
outpatient suicides is rarely imposed . . . .”); but see Kockelman v. Segal, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, 558
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“[W]e believe California courts have recognized that psychiatrists owe a
duty of care, consistent with standards in the professional community, to provide appropriate
treatment for potentially suicidal patients, whether the patient is hospitalized or not.”).
171. See Kussmann, supra note 155, at *4; Patton v. Thompson, 958 So. 2d 303, 307 (Ala.
2006).
172. Foster v. Charter Med. Corp., 601 So. 2d 435, 440 (Ala. 1992).
173. See id. (quoting Keeton v. Fayette County, 558 So. 2d 884, 887 (Ala. 1989)).
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This idea of foreseeability does not depend on the mental capacity of the
deceased at the time the suicide occurred, but rather the negligent
conduct of the mental health professional that led to or made it
reasonably foreseeable that the suicidal action would occur. 174
In addition to the foreseeability aspect of liability for an
individual’s suicide, the Supreme Court of Mississippi adds a further
element for liability. 175 Mississippi provides a rebuttable presumption
concerning suicide—the “irresistible impulse”—under which a person’s
suicide is presumed to not be a foreseeable result of another’s potential
negligence. 176 Under the Second Restatement of Torts:
If the actor’s negligent conduct so brings about the delirium or insanity
of another as to make the actor liable for it, the actor is also liable for
harm done by the other to himself while delirious or insane, if his delirium or insanity . . . makes it impossible for him to resist an impulse
caused by his insanity which deprives him of his capacity to govern his
conduct in accordance with reason. 177

Under this view, the plaintiff must show more than that the
defendant breached a duty of care which set off a chain of events leading
to the individual’s suicide. 178 The plaintiff is required to prove that the
defendant’s actions caused a mental issue, which resulted in an
“irresistible impulse” to commit suicide “in the sense that the decedent
could not have decided against and refrained from killing himself, and
because of such uncontrollable impulse, the decedent committed
suicide.” 179
In Truddle v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, the court reaffirmed a two
part “irresistible impulse” test for determining if a plaintiff is capable of
recovering from a defendant for a third party’s suicide. 180 To recover,
the plaintiff must prove (1) the decedent was under an “irresistible
impulse” rendering him or her unable to discern the nature or
consequences of suicide, and (2) the “irresistible impulse” was

174. See White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tenn. 1998).
175. The Mississippi Supreme Court has limited this to wrongful death actions, not medical
malpractice. See Truddle v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp.-Desoto, Inc., 150 So. 3d 692, 696 (Miss. 2014).
176. Mississippi ex rel Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579, 585 (Miss. 1968) (“[T]he
presumption that a person will not destroy himself by suicide is rebuttable. . . . [and] the
presumption against suicide does not exist where it appears that decedent was insane.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 (1977).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 (1977).
178. District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269, 1276 (D.C. 1987).
179. Id. (quoting Orcutt v. Spokane Cnty., 364 P.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Wash. 1961) (en banc)).
180. 150 So. 3d 692, 696 (Miss. 2014).
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proximately caused by the defendant’s intentional conduct. 181 Under the
“irresistible impulse” test, ordinary negligence will not suffice for
liability to attach; the act must be intentional. 182
Foreseeability is the key point courts should focus on when dealing
with the issue of liability for suicidal patients. The unyielding, harsh rule
which holds that suicide is a superseding act under all situations cannot
be retained. In some situations, the act of suicide is due to different
diseases 183 and without exceptions, the courts would be punishing
individuals for actions over which they have little, if any, control. The
“irresistible impulse” exception is needed and should be implemented
nation-wide. The application of this test, in the context used by the
Mississippi Supreme Court, should be the norm. In this context, an
individual should not be liable for another’s death due to a negligent act.
Liability for another’s suicide should be limited to those instances where
the defendant acted with the intent to harm his patient and the patient
later committed suicide as a result.
In regard to medical care, it is important to determine what
constitutes an intentional act. Individuals within the health care field
should be held to a higher standard. With this in mind, an “intentional
act” in the context of a health care professional should be different than
for a lay individual. In the assessment and treatment of an individual in
traditional psychiatry or telepsychiatry, the health care professional
needs to be aware of the possibility that the patient is experiencing
suicidal ideations. If the mental health provider finds that there is a
relative probability 184 that an individual may cause harm to a third-party
or to themselves, the mental health provider has a duty to take additional
steps to prevent such harm from occurring. The inability or
unwillingness of a mental health professional to take affirmative steps to
prevent the patient from harming himself or others should suffice to
allow liability to attach, even if the traditional foreseeability standard has
not been met.
E.

Recommendation

The discipline of psychiatry relies on the observation of human
behavior and human interaction. 185 The use of telepsychiatry might
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. These diseases include, but are not limited to, depression, alcoholism, and schizophrenia.
184. While there is no discernible way to test for relative probability, the mental health
professional must have more than an idea that harm will occur.
185. Savita Malhotra et al., Telepsychiatry: Promise, Potential, and Challenges, 55 INDIAN J.
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create a false sense of human interaction which could ultimately hinder
the practitioner-patient relationship. 186 This relationship is central to the
assessment and treatment of all patients. A strong practitioner-patient
relationship is absolutely essential when treating unstable patients using
I-CBT. When using this type of therapy, the involvement of highly
structured lessons and homework assignments, coupled with regular
practitioner-patient communication, is of the utmost importance. 187
Individuals in rural areas often have substandard access to mental
health practitioners. While the need for telepsychiatry is unquestionable,
certain policies and regulations need to be put in place to protect the
patients before the practice becomes more widespread and pervasive.
These policies and recommendations need to start with the informed
consent process.
1. Informed Consent
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body.” 188 This is the basic
principle of informed consent. We, as a society, find that patient
autonomy is paramount and that autonomous decisions about an
individual’s health care need to be afforded the most stringent
protections. The goal of informed consent is to allow the patient to make
an informed decision about their medical treatment. 189 Therefore,
informed consent should consist of all material facts. But, what if all
material facts are unknown?
Recent developments have allowed telepsychiatry to grow rapidly.
Due to this rapid growth, state and federal legislatures have not been
able to keep pace. With very few laws and regulations set in place, 190
mental health care professionals are using a variety of different methods
in conducting the informed consent process. 191 Currently, six states have
general informed consent laws for the practice of telemedicine.192 Six
PSYCHIATRY 3, 6 (2013).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
189. CLINICAL VIDEOCONFERENCING IN TELEHEALTH: PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND
PRACTICE 134 (Peter W. Tuerk & Peter Shore eds., 2015) [hereinafter Tuerk & Shore].
190. See Jennifer M. Little, Into the Future: The Statutory Implications of North Carolina’s
Telepsychiatry Program, 93 N.C. L. REV. 864, 878-84 (2015); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
2290.5(c) (West 2001).
191. Tuerk & Shore, supra note 190, at 135.
192. Little, supra note 191, at 882. These states are Arizona, California, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, and Texas.
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other states have implemented statutes that require that specific
information be provided. 193 This information ranges from potential risks
and benefits of telemedicine to how the patient can access medical
records. 194 While these informed consent laws will better protect
patients, they are not without flaws. Primarily, these laws only direct
mental health care providers to inform patients of certain issues
pertaining to telepsychiatry. While the disclosure of specific information
concerning telepsychiatry better informs the patient of the treatment they
will receive, this could also infringe upon the treating physician’s
judgment and affect the patient’s care. 195 While the specific information
approach is well founded, this approach needs to be expanded.
In addition to the information a practitioner is required to disclose
under traditional informed consent principles, additional information
must be provided for an individual to fully consent because
telepsychiatry is highly technical and a relatively novel practice. The
informed consent process must be continually on-going and consistent
throughout the course of treatment.
First, the mental health care professional should disclose all
information that is traditionally required for informed consent.
Additionally, the patient should be aware of the following factors: (1) all
potential risks and benefits of telepsychiatry; 196 (2) safeguards to protect
against any risks associated with telepsychiaty; (3) privacy and
confidentiality; (4) how this treatment can differ from traditional
therapy; (5) legal rights, in the case of adverse events; (6) the structure
of the treatment; (7) safety protocols; (8) termination procedures; (9)
potential risks concerning electronic transmission, such as distortions,
delays, and the possibility of unauthorized interception of medical data
transmission; 197and (10) any other information that a reasonably prudent
mental health professional would disclose under similar
circumstances. 198 These ten factors should be discussed by the mental
health professional with the patient so that they can ask questions or
relate any concerns to the practitioner. Furthermore, these ten factors
should also be presented to the patient in writing so that the practitioner
has a clear record of the information which informed the patient’s
193. Id. These states are Alabama, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, and
Oklahoma.
194. Id. at 882-83.
195. Id. at 884, n. 155.
196. This includes the possible “experimental” nature of telepsychiatry.
197. Kip Poe, Telemedicine Liability: Texas and Other States Delve Into the Uncertainties of
Health Care Delivery Via Advanced Communications Technology, 20 REV. LITIG. 681, 687 (2001).
198. Tuerk & Shore, supra note 190, at 135.
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consent and so that the patient can easily refer back to this information at
a later date.
This proposed rule will afford the patient all the protection that is
necessary to make a fully informed decision. This rule will also allow
the mental health professional to use her professional judgment in
informing the patient.
2. Standard of Care
Another pressing issue in the implementation of telepsychiatry is
determining the appropriate standard of care. Currently, the extent of
potential liability for practicing telepsychiatry across state lines is
uncertain. 199 Traditionally, states dictate policy regarding the health and
safety of their citizens. 200 This police power allows an individual state to
implement regulations and laws which are uniquely tailored to meet the
particular health and safety needs of its own citizens. 201
Predictably, one state’s exercise of its police powers frequently puts
its laws in conflict with the tort laws of other states. Historically, the
standard of care for medical professionals was geographically limited;
this limitation was expressed through the locality rule. 202 The locality
rule was based on the rationale that there was a disparity in medical
knowledge and treatment between large urban areas and rural areas.203
But the advancement of modern technology, the internet, and modern
medicine has made the locality rule mostly obsolete.204
The differences and changes in the field of medicine occur
temporally (i.e., because of changes in technology and access to

199. Caryl, supra note 117, at 192.
200. Id. This power is reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. X. (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
201. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926) (“[T]here is no right to practice
medicine which is not subordinate to the police power of the States.”); Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S.
339 (1917); Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); La.
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs v. Fife, 111 So. 58 (La. 1926), aff’d 274 U.S. 720 (1927); Ross D.
Silverman, Regulating Medical Practice in the Cyber Age: Issues and Challenges For State Medical
Boards, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 255, 256 (2000).
202. See Kuszler, supra note 121, at 315 (“Under this standard, the physician or other provider
must abide by the standard of care in the local geographic area.”).
203. Orcutt v. Miller, 595 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Nev. 1979).
204. See, e.g., Kronke v. Danielson, 499 P.2d 156 (Ariz. 1972); Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d
370 (Ky. 1970); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass’n, 349 A.2d 245 (Md. 1975);
Naccarato v. Grob, 180 N.W.2d 788 (Mich. 1970); Belk v. Schweizer, 149 S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 1966);
Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1967); Shier v. Freedman, 206 N.W.2d 166 (Wis.
1973).
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information over time), not geographically. 205 At a touch of a button,
medical students and medical professionals have access to the latest
literature, videos on the latest procedures, and the like. 206 The adoption
of a national standard is a must for telepsychiatry to prevail. The
resources that are now readily available to medical professionals make it
clear that the obstacles which once prevented the easy exchange of
medical knowledge and techniques (and thus supported the locality rule)
have been toppled. A psychiatrist in rural Montana now has access to the
exact same information as a psychiatrist in New York City.
Traditionally, the standard of care for medical professionals can be
phrased as the degree of care which a reasonably prudent medical
professional would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. 207
In medicine, psychiatry is considered a specialty. 208 The fact that
psychiatry is considered a specialty heightens the standard of care,
requiring that the degree of care is not that of a reasonably prudent
physician, but that of a reasonably prudent psychiatrist under similar
circumstances. 209
As to practitioners of telepsychiatry, the standard of care should be
even more demanding than that applicable to psychiatrists generally. The
practice of telepsychiatry should be considered a sub-specialty of
psychiatry. The differences between traditional psychiatry and
telepsychiatry are too great to allow for the same standard of care.
Practitioners of telepsychiatry have all the skills of a traditional
psychiatrist, but more should be required of them. As noted above, the
lack of face-to-face contact can create many issues. While some of these
issues can be easily resolved during a face-to-face therapeutic session,
an individual practicing telepsychiatry will need to take additional
precautions or have an additional individual present. The differences
between traditional psychiatry and telepsychiatry warrant a different
standard of care.
3. Miscellaneous Issues
When traditional therapy is conducted, the mental health
professional has the ability to recognize different non-verbal cues and
make a determination on whether or not the patient will act on their

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
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Id.
Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 560 (D.C. 1979).
See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971).
See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (1976).

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 8

962

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:933

impulses and attempt to commit suicide. The traditional mental health
professional is better equipped to handle these situations by contacting
local police departments or other medical practitioners if she feels the
patient needs to be committed to a hospital due to risk that the patient
will harm himself or others. This might not be the case for
telepsychiatry. Because of the need for mental health practitioners in
rural areas, this deficiency must be weighed against the benefits of
telepsychiatry. The principle of non-maleficence is instilled in all
medical professionals. But the issue that arises is whether the obligation
to do no harm is more stringent than the obligation to help. 210
The only discernable way to prevent this harm is by requiring that
some sort of medical professional be present with the patient during any
treatment sessions. These medical professionals should have some
experience dealing with mental health issues.211 Additionally, these
medical health professionals should be familiar with local law
enforcement and emergency services, in case of adverse events. The
treating mental health professional should also contact local law
enforcement and hospitals and emergency services about treatment being
conducted in the area. 212
Finally, the treating physician and the patient should establish and
implement an emergency plan.213 First, the mental health professional
should try to convince the patient to have a family member or a close
friend nearby during treatment sessions. 214 Additionally, as stated above,
local law enforcement agencies should be notified. During the general
notification, the treating medical professional should inform law
enforcement of the current situation, the condition the patient is or could
be in and the impact of the patient’s condition on the interaction with
law enforcement, and information on mental health follow-up, resources,
and support for patients. 215 Next, the practitioner should have a frank
discussion with the patient. The patient needs to be aware that there are
plans set in place to prevent any harm to the patient or anyone else. In

210. Raanan Gillon, “Primum non Nocere” and the Principle of Non-Maleficence, 291 BRIT.
MED. J. 130, 130 (1985).
211. Individuals without previous mental health experience should be trained and shadow
other professionals during assessments.
212. The only concern is the potential HIPAA violations and privacy. These concerns could be
alleviated so long as the treating mental health professional does not divulge any personal
identifiable information to individuals whom should be notified.
213. Jay H. Shore et al., supra note 15, at 200, tbl. 1 (sample emergency guidelines for
telepsychiatry).
214. See id. at 204 (involving family members can be extremely helpful).
215. Id. at 203-04.
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this discussion, the patient must be made fully aware of the emergency
plan that has been established. The mental health professional should
also explain the reasoning for the notifications to the law enforcement
agency and the hospitals. Last, this emergency plan should be discussed
with any party that might be affected by the emergency plan. 216
V. CONCLUSION
Mental illness affects a significant number of individuals in both
urban and rural settings alike. Suicide is becoming more prevalent,
especially in rural areas in America. This is mainly due the issue of
accessibility. The rural community is at a substantial disadvantage when
it comes to accessibility. Telepsychiatry is mostly aimed at solving this
disadvantage. Telepsychiatry is unquestionably needed. But, without
proper legal and ethical consideration, it is bound to have many issues.
In the context of medical malpractice, it is clear the law needs to
evolve. Individuals with mental illnesses need to be afforded more
protection than what they are currently given. First, when a mental
health professional is implementing telepsychiatry, the patient must be
fully informed. This includes the experimental nature of telepsychiatry
along with all associated risks—even if all the risks are unknown.
Secondly, the duty that a practitioner owes to a patient when practicing
telepsychiatry should be assessed by a national standard of care.
Technological advancements have eroded all barriers to the collection of
knowledge. The easy access to the latest research and theories further
shows that the “locality” rule is outmoded; the only logical step is to
implement a national standard.
Legally, there is not a difference between traditional, face-to-face
therapy, and telepsychiatry. This also needs to be addressed. The
standard of care should be that of a specialist. Mental health
professionals who use telepsychiatry should be held to the standard of a
prudent mental health professional who is using telepsychiatry.
Finally, legislatures must implement laws and regulations setting up
emergency plans for individuals who are receiving treatment. This is a
protective measure that is not extensive but is capable of preventing
many issues. Additionally, a mental health professional should always
be present with an individual receiving treatment through telepsychiatry.
These individuals should have experience dealing with mental illness or
should have training. Finally, local first responders should be notified
216. Such parties may include hospitals, law enforcement, family members who might be
present, and the medical professional present during the therapy sessions.
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that there is an individual who is receiving treatment for suicidal
ideations, and should be given the patient’s condition, information on the
impact that interaction with first responders could have on the patient,
and information on mental health follow-up, resources and support for
this individual.
Telepsychiatry is needed in rural America. It is a great tool that
should be used. With these recommendations, many issues concerning
medical malpractice in the context of telepsychiatry will be minimized if
not completely resolved.
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